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MILITARY LAW FROM PEARL HARBOR TO KOREA
HAROLD F. McaIECEt & JOHN V. THORNTONI

ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, the Japanese military forces attacked
Pearl Harbor, and precipitated United States entry into World
War II. At that time the body of America's military law was much
the same as it had been for many years in the past. Indeed the Articles which governed the Navy1 were not unlike Cromwell's Articles of
1649,2 and the Army was ruled by a statute which still bore the marks
of an ancient Roman predecessor. This is not to say that the military
law system was crumbling and inefficient. Particularly because of the
high caliber of its administrators, the system was operating reasonably
well, but, like any body of law which exists for many years without
change, it was in need of modernization.
Some ten years later America is again at war, if the Korean "police
action" be given a name befitting its de facto status. But today the
United States system of military justice, while still in some ways imperfect, is probably as modem as any in the world. The administration of military law in all branches of the military and naval service is
now regulated by the recently enacted and forward looking Uniform
Code of Military Justice? This statute provides a substantially greater
number of trial and pretrial safeguards for accused persons than did
the older laws, and it establishes for the first time a civilian Court of
Military Appeals4 as the highest tribunal within the court-martial system.
The purpose here is to study this decade of progress. First the status
of military law at the time of Pearl Harbor is set forth. Consideration
is next given to the proposals for court-martial reform which were put
forth during and after World War II, and to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice,' which emerged as the end product of the reform
movement. Analysis is made of major deficiences which still exist in
the statutory framework of military law as represented by the Code,
and attention is paid to opinions rendered by the newly established
Court of Military Appeals. It is too early to formulate definitive cont Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
it Instructor in Law, New York University School of Law.
1. REv. STAT. 1624 (1875).
2. Pasley and Larkin, The Navy Court-Martial:Proposals for itsReform, 33 Coa.:UL
L.Q. 195, 198 (1947).
3. Pub. L. No. 506, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (May 5, 1950) (Effective May 31, 195I);
64 STIT. 108 (1950); 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 551-741 (Supp. 1951).
CODE OF MIARY JUsTXcr, Art. 67, 64 STAT. 129,
4. Established by the UNinom
50 U.S.C.A. § 654 (Supp. 1951).
5. See note 3 supra.
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clusions about the work of that court, but some tentative insights into
its attitudes can be gleaned.
Following discussions of statutory changes and decisions of the Court
of Military Appeals, study is made of leading federal civil court decisions during the past ten years. Developments in judicial review of
courts-martial and military commissions are touched upon, and some
general conclusions are offered.
LAW AT THE TIME OF PEARL HARBOR
On December 7, 1941, Army personnel were governed by the Articles
of War,' and Navy personnel by the Articles for the Government of the
United States Navy.' The origins of both of these statutes reached far
back into antiquity.
The bedrock of the Articles of War was the British Articles of
1774,8 and these were of ancient vintage. In fact, John Adams, who
was responsible for their speedy adoption by the Continental Congress
to meet an emergency,' described them as "only a literal translation of
the Roman."1 Adams appreciated the rigorous character of the British
Articles, and he never expected them to be enacted on this side of the
Atlantic without a good deal of liberalization." Those were days of
great haste, however, and, as it turned out, the British Articles were
adopted without real change. These Articles, despite repeals, reenact12
ments, rearrangements, and reclassifications, remained in basic pattern the same through World War I.8
World War I, like World War II, gave birth to movements for
changes in military law, but these movements came to naught. In 1920
the Chamberlain Bill, proposed many important modifications in the
AMERICAN MILITARY

6. 41 STAT. 787 (1920).
7. See note 1 supra.

8. Ansell, Military Justice, 5 CORNEaLL L.Q. 1, 3-4 (1919); Morgan, The Existing

Keeffe,
Court-Martial System and the Ansell Army Articles, 29 YALE L.J. 52 (1919);
Universal Military Training With or Without Reform of Courts-Martial? 33 CoRNEL
L.Q. 465, 467 (1948).
9. Ansell, supra note 8.
says of
10. 3 CHARLES F. ADAMS, WORIS or JoHN ADAMS 93 (1850). John Adams
war,
of
articles
of
system
one
extant
was
"There
articles:
American
the origin of the
and the British,
which had carried two empires to the head of command, the Roman
Roman. . . . I was
for the British Articles of War were only a literal translation of the

articles were
therefore for reporting the British articles totidem verbis. . . . The British
Law,
Military
American
in
Review
Appellate
See also Fratcher,
accordingly reported.'
15,. 17-19 (1949).
14 Mo. L. REv.
11.

12.

Ansell, supra note 8, at 4.

Detailed in Morgan, supra note 8, at 52 n. 1, and Ansell, supra note 8, at 4-5.

13. Ibid.
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Army system, 4 was defeated, and only small changes were made. 15
The legislative situation remained virtually static thereafter. Thus in
1941 the ancient hand of Rome was still a force in Army justice.
The Navy court-martial system was somewhat newer in origin than
the Army one. But this relative youth was counterbalanced by the fact
that the Navy system did not experience the slight overhaul that the
Army procedures received in 1920. The first American naval articles
were, like the Army ones, compiled by John Adams from their British
counterpart. 6 These British Articles (of 1749) were essentially Cromwell's Articles of a hundred years earlier.' 7 Since very few changes
were made in the basic framework of the British Articles after their
adoption over here,'" the American naval law in force at the time of
Pearl Harbor still had a distinct flavor of Cromwell's Articles of three
hundred years before.
PROPOSALS FOR STATUTORY REFORm1 DURING AND AFTER WORLD WAR II
World War II, of course, brought a tremendous and rapid increase
in the armed forces. A military justice mechanism which had been
functioning well enough in a small peacetime Army and Navy of volunteers was suddenly forced to operate in a vast wartime establishment
composed largely of conscripts. Any inherent defects were complicated
by the necessity of employing inexperienced men among the personnel
of court, prosecution, and defense.'" Some abuses occurred. How widespread they were is still a matter of unresolved speculation. It now •
seems clear that the abuses were far fewer than was commonly supposed.
But whether the abuses* were in fact many or few is not important for
the public commenced to believe that they were many.
As a result public confidence in military justice ebbed considerably.
14. S. 64, H.R. 367, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919). The Chamberlain Bill eliminated
review of court-martial findings by the convening authority or any other superior
military authority, and established a court of military appeals.
15. By 41 STAT. 759-812 (1920); Keeffe, supra note 8. Principal changes included
the requirement of an impartial pre-trial investigation, the provision of a "law member"
for every general court-martial, and the establishment of Boards of Review in the Office
of the Judge Advocate General to review certain types of serious cases.
16. Pasley and Larkin, supra note 2, at 196-8.
17. There were predecessors to Cromwell's Articles such as Tim BrAcn Boon or
T=E AnmmuLTY, prepared in 1351, and the Ordinance of Richard I of 1190, but these
had little lasting influence. THE BLACK Boor or

T=

ADam-LTY, edited by Sir Travers

Twiss, was republished in London in 1871, and the Ordinance of Richard I is reprinted
in WINTHRoP, M=zrrARY LAW A-M PRECEDENTS 903 (1895 ed., 1920 reprint).
18. Some important changes, of course, did occur between 1774 and 1941, but these
were far fewer than is sometimes supposed.
19. Cramer, military Justice and Trial Procedure, 29 A.B.A.J. 368, 370 (1943).
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During the latter part of World War II and immediately after its
termination, there was a barrage of criticism directed at substantive
military law and its administration. It is unnecessary to detail specific
cases of alleged abuses to which much publicity was given, and which
have been summarized elsewhere.2 0 Suffice it to say that the volume
of criticism-much of which in retrospect seems unjustifiable-was great
enough to cause the services themselves to look into the possibilities of
reform.
In 1946 the Secretary of War appointed the War Department Advisory Committee on Military Justice, headed by Arthur T. Vanderbilt,
2
now Chief Justice of New Jersey, to make an analysis. The House
Military Affairs Committee of the 79th Congress likewise made an
extensive study. 2 Similar developments took place in the Navy. A
committee under the chairmanship of Arthur A. Ballantine, former
Under-Secretary of the Treasury, submitted one report in 1 9 4 3 2I and
another in 1946.24 Other investigations were conducted by Father
Judge Matthew F. McGuire, 20 and Prof. Arthur
Robert J. White,'
27
John Keeffe.
The findings and recommendations of these numerous groups naturally varied in details. Surprisingly enough, however, the core of their
suggestions was much the same. Typical were those of the War Department Advisory Committee. 28 The Committee made no general indictment of military justice. It found, for example, that the oft-repeated
charge that innocent persons were convicted by courts-martial was untrue. It discovered, however, that sometimes sentences were imposed
2
which were entirely disproportionate to the offenses. " Then too, it
20. See Wallstein, The Revision of the Army Court-Martial System, 48 CoL. L. REV.
218, 221-30 (1948), and Pasley, supra note 2, at 28-32 for specific instances.
21. The committee's findings are contained in REPORT OF WAR DEP'T ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON MILITARY JUSTICE TO THE SEC'Y oF WAR (Dec. 1946).

22. H.R. REP. No. 2722, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946). In 1947 the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York appointed a committee to consider reforms in military
justice, headed by Frederick P. Bryan. See REPORT or Ass'N Or Tnr BAR Or TnE CITY
The New York State
Bar Association also appointed a Special Committee on the Administration of Military
Justice under the Chairmanship of former Justice Phillip J. McCook.
23. REPORT Or BALLENTINE COMMISSION TO THE SEC'Y or TuE NAVY (Sept. 1943).
CoOM-ssI N TO THE SEc'y or Tma NAvY (April 1946).
24. REPORT OF BALLENTn
25. WmTr, A STUDY OF. 500 NAVAL PRISONERS AND NAVAL JUSTICE (Jan. 1947).
1945).
26. REPORT OF THE McGumIE COUiSSION TO TE SEC'Y or mau NAVY (Nov.
OF NEW YORK, SPECIAL COaMITTEE ON MILITARY JUSTICE (1948).

27.

TIa SaC'Y
REPORT OF TE GENERAL COURT MRTIAL SENTENCE REVIEW BOARD TO

OF THE NAVY (Jan. 1947).
Ad28. These are detailed in its REPORT, supra .note 21, and summairized in Holtzoff,
(1947).'
ministration of Justice in The United States Army, 22 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV.Al
appointed a
29. This is perhaps best shown by the fact that the Secretary" of War
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reported, some commanding officers apparently felt that they were free
to influence the decisions of courts-martial appointed and reviewed by
them, especially in regard to sentences. As a result courts-martial were
sometimes instructed to impose maximum sentences and leave it to the
commanding officer (as reviewing authority) to reduce them to the
proper figures.3 It also happened that courts-martial were occasionally
reprimanded orally by commanding officers, and now-and-then even in
writing, because of the imposition of "inadequate" sentences.' The net
effect of these pressures was to take away the independence of such
courts-martial as were affected by them and to transfer some of the
court-martial functions to commanding officers.
Another defect was the failure, in some instances, to employ legally
trained personnel to perform law work. It was not uncommon to use
laymen as law members or defense counsel of courts-martial. Under the
stress of war conditions the Armed Forces apparently failed to recognize law as a profession in the same sense in which they recognized
medicine 32 Whereas every physician taken into the service was given
a commission and assigned medical duties, lawyer applicants for commissions were frequently told that there was no room for lawyers as
such in a wartime military organization. When these lawyers volunClemency Board to review all sentences of imprisonment and reduce the excessive ones.
Holtzoff, supra note 28, at 10, states that, "some sentences border on the fantastic. A
seventy-five year sentence is not unknown, and fifty or twenty-five year sentences for
infractions of discipline are not uncommon." Another difficulty was the disproportion
in sentences between the Army and Navy. The Navy, for example, has not executed a
man since 1842 when Midshipman Philip Spencer, a nephew of the Secretary of War,
was hanged for conspiring to mutiny (See David, An Episode in Naval Justice, Los
ANGELs B. BULL. (Feb.-March 1952)), whereas the Army, including the Air Force,
from 1942 to 1948 executed 93 men for murder, 52 for rape, and 1 for desertion. J.A.G.
JoURSNAL 21 (Nov. 1951). There were also differences in the length of sentence between
the two services for less serious offenses. Keeffe, Universal Military Training Wilh or
Without Reform of Courts martial? 33 CoNEm, L.Q. 465, 469-70 (1948).
30. In a series of desertion cases tried at Norfolk, Mirginia,-the courts-martial uniformly
imposed a sentence of 15 years which the Admiral at Norfolk reduced in each case to
SzC'V
3 years. REPORT or GmzERAL COURT MARTIAL SF-r-'RC REVIEW BO.ARD T T
or THE NAvY § 1, pp. 1-12 (1947).
31. Holtzoff, supra note 28, at 9.
32. Id. at 11. justice Holtzoff states: "This attitude was illustrated by a retired
Army Colonel who testified at one of the hearings before the Advisory Committee. He
stated that in his opinion the law member of a general court-martial did not have to
be a lawyer, since he was given a Manual which he could study and which would guide
him in making his rulings. The writer, who presided at the hearing, asked the witness
whether he would be willing to designate a layman as a regimental doctor, if the latter
would study a brief pamphlet on medicine. Naturally, the witness had no answer to
make."
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teered or were inducted, they were very often assigned non-legal duties.
Yet later on the Armed Forces sometimes sought to excuse the failure
counsel of courtsto appoint lawyers as law members and defense
33
unavailable.
were
they
that
martial by asserting
The Committee also unearthed instances of discrimination in the
military legal system in favor of officers and against enlisted men.
Minor misconduct particularly was at times overlooked in the case of
officers but punished when enlisted men were involved. 4
To meet these and other difficulties, a number of recommendations
were made. Principally the Committee expressed the view that "command control" of courts-martial should be eliminated by taking away
the power to appoint courts-martial from commanding officers and giving it to the Judge Advocate General. The Committee would, however,
have allowed commanding officers to retain the power to reduce sentences. It further urged that the law member of every general courtmartial, as well as the trial judge advocate and defense counsel, be
lawyers in every instance. In addition it was recommended that the
Judge Advocate General's Department be enlarged and made more independent in order to perform the additional services visualized.
THE UNIFORM

CODE OF MILITARY

JUSTICE

As a result of the widespread discussion and criticism of the courtmartial system 3 5 and the work of these various committees, reform in
military justice progressed from theoretical discussion to actuality. It
is unnecessary here to deal with the various interim and stop-gap measures which appeared on the scene, and the discussion will be limited to
the general picture.
Both the War and Navy Department submitted separate "reform
33. Illustrations of cases involving inadequate legal representation are given in Wallstein, supra note 20, at 226-9.
34. Id. at 229-30.
35. The good features of the military court system should not, of course, be overlooked. In a number of respects the civil system can learn from the military. As Prof.
Wigmore once put it, "In established military trial procedure, three measures are In
regular practice, which are lacking in ordinary civilian criminal procedure. First, In
felony cases the accused is furnished counsel without charge. Secondly, the accused Is
furnished gratis one of the three complete transcripts of everything that takes place
at the trial. Thirdly, the record of the trial is automatically sent up to the Appellate
Tribunal for review, without cost to the accused. Of these three features, the first one
is taken care of already by the Public Defender System where it has been established.
But the second and third, so far as I know, are totally lacking. I believe that the
lack of those two features constitutes an unforgivable defect in our criminal procedure."
Quoted in Cramer, supra note 19.
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bills" early in the 80th Congress.0 0 During the first session of that
Congress there was passed the National Security Act of 1947 which
sought to unify the armed forces. The Chairman of the Senate Armed
Services Committee then suggested that the Secretary of Defense prepare a bill providing for a uniform legal system for all the military services. In response to the suggestion Secretary Forrestal in July, 1948 appointed a special committee, under the chairmanship of Prof. Edmund
Morgan, to draft a uniform code. An intensive seven-month study was
conducted by the Morgan Committee, and the end result was a proposed bill. Extensive hearings were then held, with representatives of
the Morgan Committee, veterans' associations, bar associations, Reserve
officers' association, and the Judge Advocates General of the armed
services appearing to testify. Finally emerged the Uniform Code of
Military3 Justice,"7 a composite of the ideas of many persons and
groups. 8
Perhaps the most important reform the Code introduces is the establishment of a Court of Military Appeals composed of three civilian
judges.3 9 Functioning as the "Supreme Court" of the revised system,
36. H.R. No. 2575, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); S. 903, 80th Cong., 1st Ss. (1947);
S. 2229, 80th Cong., 3d Sess. (1948)

(Army bill); H.R. No. 3687, S. 1338, 80th Cong.,

1st Sess. (1947) (Navy bill). The program of the War Department is dicussed in
Royall, Revision Of The Military Justice Process As Proposed By The War DePartment,
33 VA. L. Rav. 269 (1947). The origins of the Code are also traced in Morgan, The
L. REv. 169 (1953).
Background of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 6 VN"Am.
37. See note 3 supra.
CODE OF M=rArY JUsrIc, See SM. REP.
38. For legislative history of the UNxroaIl
No. 486 (June 10, 1949); U.S. CODE CONG. SEav. No. 4, pp. 886, 889-90 (1950).

The

commentators have generally received the Code favorably. Cf. the dissenting views of
Keeffe and Moskin, Codified Militory Injustice, 35 CorNULr L.Q. 151 (1949).
The New English Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act, 1951, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, c. 46 has many
similarities to the Uniform Code. Under the British Statute a Courts-Martial Appeal
Court is let up analogous to our Court of Military Appeals. Like the American Code,
the English Act applies to the three branches of the armed forces with unimportant
differences. However, all appeals are by leave of the court, whereas some appeals are
mandatory under our Code.
The Lewis Committee in England recommended that appeals should be on questions
of law alone but the Act as passed contains no such limitation. From the decision of
the appellate tribunal there can be a further appeal to the House of Lords if either side
applies to the Attorney-General and he gives a certificate that a point of law of exAct,
ceptional public importance is involved. See Griffiths, Courts-M1artial (Appeals)
1951, 15 MoDERN L. REv. 65 (1952); Pasley, A Comparative Study of Military Justice
Reforms in Britain and America, 6 VAND. L. REv. 305 (1953).
U.S. C. A. § 654
39. UM'oaax CODE OF MrArrRy JusacE, Art. 67, 64 STAT. 129, 50
cases:
(Supp. 1951). The court reviews the record in the following
(1) All cases in which the sentence, as affirmed by a board of review, affects a
general or flag officer or extends to death;
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the new tribunal is located for administrative purposes in the Department of Defense but is completely independent of military control.40
After less than a year of active operation, the court was docketing cases
at rates which indicate that it will have a yearly volume considerably
greater than that of the United States Supreme Court.41 As of the
middle of 1952 the total number of petitions for review which had been
filed represented approximately 10% of the total number of cases in
which a convicted serviceman was eligible to file, and the rate was increasing.4 Another improvement brought forth by the Code tends to insure a
more able trial tribunal. The new statute makes it an absolute requirement that trial and defense counsel in a general court-martial be trained
legal personnel certified as competent by their Judge Advocate General.4 Under the former procedure legal personnel had to be used only
"if available," and availability was a matter within the convening authority's largely uncontrolled discretion.44
(2) All cases reviewed by a board of review which the Judge Advocate General
orders forwarded for review; and
(3) All cases reviewed by a board of review in which, upon petition of the accused
and on good cause shown, the Court has granted a review.
40. Congress did not intend the court to he subject to the "authority, direction, or
control of the Secretary of Defense", as the legislative history shows. SEN. REP. No. 486
(June 10, 1949); U.S. CODE CONG. SERv. No. 4, pp. 886, 918 (1950). The first bench, a
most distinguished one, is made up of Chief Judge Robert E. Quinn, former Governor
of Rhode Island and Judge of the Superior Court there; Judge George W. Latimer,
former Associate Justice of the Utah Supreme Court; and Judge Paul W. Brosman,
former Dean of Tulane Law School.
41. Walker, The United States Court of Military Appeals: A Long Overdue Addition
to the Judiciary, 38 A.B.A.J. 567 (1952). During the first sixteen months of Its
operation over 1700 cases were filed with the court and final action completed In some
1300 of them. Walker and Mebank, The Court of Military Appeals-Its History Organization & Operation, 6 V.ND. L. Rav. 228 (1953).
42. Ibid. Other recent articles discussing the Court of Military Appeals include Garraty,
United States Court of Military Appeals, JAG JouaxAL 3 (March, 1952) and Spindler,
The Uniform Code of Military Justice-New Rights and a Means to Enforce Them, 50
Micr. L. REv. 1084 (1952). For general discussion of the Code the best articles seem
to be Prof. Re's, The Uniform Code of Military Justice, 25 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 155
(1951) and Admiral Russell's paper of the same name in 19 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 233
(1951). See also Butts, The Uniform Code of Military Justice, 22 Miss. L.J. 203 (1951) ;
Larkin, The Military Justice Code and You, J.A.G. J. 3 (April, 1951). Cf. Brigadier
Lawson's article tracing the changes effected in Canadian military law by the National
Defense Act of 1950, 14 Geo. VI, c. 43. Canadian Military Law, 29 CAN. B. REV. 241
(1951).

43. UNIFORM CODE OF MrrIrARY JusricE, Art. 27, 64 STAT. 117, g0 U.S.C.A. § 591
(Supp. 1951).
44. Art. of War II, 62 STAT. 629, 10 U. S. C. A. § 1482 (Supp. III, 1950); Hiatt v,
Brown, 339 U.S. 103 (1950).
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The new Code also provides for a legally qualified person to be apThe law officer,
pointed as "law officer" of a general court-martial
who is not a member of the court, supplants the former "law member,"
and is much more a full-fledged "judge" than was the law member.4
DEFICIENCIES IN THE UNIFORM CODE

Some experience has now been accumulated under the Uniform Code,
and the First Annual Report of the Court of Military Appeals and the
Judge Advocates General has appeared." This First Report, covering
the period from May 31, 1951 to May 31, 1952, recommended that
Congress take no action at this time on most of the changes which have
been proposed in the Uniform Code, pending further experience in its
administration." It was urged, however, that legislation be enacted
prohibiting special courts-martial from adjudging bad conduct dis45.

Ui','Or. CODE OF

JusTIcE, Art. 26, 64 STAT. 117, 50 U.S.C.A. § 590
.miITARY

(Supp. 1951).
46.

See Uasroimsr CODE OF MILITARY JusTicE, Art. 51, 64 STAT. 124, 50 U.S.C.A.

§ 626 (Supp. 1951); Art. 39, 64 STAT. 121, 50 U.S.C.A. § 614 (Supp. 1951). It may
be expected that the Court of Military Appeals will be diligent in protecting the prerogatives of the law officer, if U.S. v. Berry, 2 CMR 141 (1952), is representative of its
attitudes (usurpation by president of court-martial of law member's functions held
error on basis of general prejudice). But Cf. U.S. v. Jones, No. 79, USCMA (1952).
47. AvxAL REPORT OF THE U-',TE STATES COURT OF MUTARY ApEAL.S AND THE
JmwE ADVoc=As GERAL or THE ARMED FoRcES (1952). The Report is required by
Art. 67 of the Uniform Code. 64 STAT. 129, 50 U.S. C. A. § 654 (Supp. 1951). That
article in subdivision g provides: "The Court of Military Appeals and The Judge Advocates General of the armed forces shall meet annually to make a comprehensive survey
of the operation of this chapter and report to the Committees on Armed Services of
the Senate and of the House of Representatives and to the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretaries of the Departments the number and status of pending cases and any recommendations relating to uniformity of sentence policies, amendments to this chapter, and
any other matters deemed appropriate."
48. Id. at 3-4. The REPORT listed as some of the suggestions: "A procedure for appropriate appellate review in the event of the increase work load which would result
from a war or national emergency; the creation of a separate Judge Advocate General's
Corps for the Navy and Air Force or the abolition of the separate promotion list of

the Judge Advocate General's Corps of the Army and restoration of Army Judge Advocates to their proper positions on the Army promotion list; an appropriate noncommand channel for processing efficiency or effectiveness reports; the convening of
courts by others than commanding officers; a further limitation on command control
over the administration of military justice; a return to the prior law member procedure;
a limitation on the jurisdiction of special courts-martial to adjudge punitive discharges;
a provision for the court to review questions of fact; an authorization for the court to
reduce sentences when they are considered excessive as a matter of fact or when a part
of the findings only are affirmed; revision of service personnel regulations; and, the
elimination of time-consuming and costly procedures which are not material to the
substantial rights of an accused person.'
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charges.4" Since bad conduct discharge is in most respects just as
severe a punishment as a dishonorable discharge,5° and a special courtmartial does not provide the same safeguards for an accused as does a
general court,5 the recommendation, at least insofar as it pertains to
the Army and Air Force, seems thoroughly sound."
The Report reveals a number of administrative difficulties which have
arisen, such as lack of adequate office space and quartering facilities for
the Court of Military Appeals, 3 and a shortage of lawyer officers 4
and court-reporters. 5 These problems are of no great long run concern,
however, since they are of the type that naturally accompany a general
transition and just as naturally work out with the passage of time.
From analysis of the Report, it seems clear that the Armed Forces
are making a genuine effort to implement the forward-looking spirit
of the Code." The' Judge Advocates General are particularly to be
complimented on the work they and their offices have done. Laboring
under the severe handicap of having to overhaul the entire machinery
of imiilitary justice in the midst of the Korean War, 7 the military legal
branches are doing a good job. For example, large-scale educational
programs have been conducted, including even the production of motion
pictures on military justice.58
49. Id. at 4.
50. See Keeffe and Moskin, supra note 38, at 157; Blake, Punishment Aspects of a
Bad Conduct Discharge, J.A.G. J. 5 (Dec. 1952).
51. For example, no law officer is required on a special court-martial, and legally
trained personnel are not absolutely required therein. UNIFORMs CODE oF MIUTARY JusTICE, Arts. 26, 27, 64 STAT. 117, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 590, 591 (Supp. 1951).
52. The Navy and Coast Guard wish to continue in their services the power of special
courts to award bad conduct discharges. Report, supra note 47, at 5. Special problems
of the seagoing forces may well justify this view. See Ward, VCMJ-Does It Work?, 6
VAND. L. REv. 186, 211-16 (1953).
53 Id. at 10.
54. Id. at 18.
55. Ibid. The shortage is especially acute in overseas commands.

56. Chief Judge Quinn is of the view that, "the services have made excellent progress
in improving the caliber of court-martial trials and in carrying out the spirit of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice." Personal communication to one of the authors,
September 11, 1952.

57. Admiral Nunn points out that, "the need for implementing the Uniform Code of
Military Justice arose almost simultaneously with the outbreak of hostilities in Korea.
This circumstance created some difficulty in the transition to the procedures of the
Code, but gave us an excellent opportunity to observe the workings of this new statute
relative to combat forces in the field. I believe we have learned a lot in the past fifteen
months the Code has been in operation that will help us to maintain the high standards
in the administration of justice expected in the armed services." Personal communication
to one of the authors, September 9, 1952.
58. REPORT, supra note 47, at 10-11, 17-18, 23-5, 29-30, 35.
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However, despite the substantive improvements which the Uniform
Code makes in military justice, and the diligence of the services in implementing these improvements, the basic question still remains: has
the Code gone far enough in achieving reform?
It may well be argued that it has not, particularly on the vital question of "command control." The commanding officer in his role as
convening authority still appoints the members of the court, the law
officer, the trial counsel, and the defense counsel, and in his position as
reviewing authority still passes on the findings and sentence. Although
practically all of the civilians who served on the various reform committees, and many military men, recommended that such functions, or
at least a large part of them, be taken away from the commanding
officer, nothing has been done on that score.
Of course the Code, in a fashion somewhat stronger than the former
law," does prohibit the convening authority from influencing a courtmartial,"0 but the effectiveness of this provision is highly questionable.
A commanding officer's influence will not be exercised in an obvious
and clearly bad-intentioned way. If exercised at all, it will be exercised
subtly and in the honest, though mistaken belief, that the cause of
justice is being promoted. Under such circumstances it is very doubtful
if a subordinate officer would be inclined to prefer charges against his
superior for violation of the influence prohibition. The only effective
way to eliminate "command control" is to entirely remove the appointment and review functions of the commanding officer, at least in
general court-martial cases.0 1
What seems to be another defect in the Code, but one of much less
consequence, is the continuation of a separate Judge Advocate General's
office, or its equivalent, for each arm of the service. 2 Under a so-called
"Uniform" Code it would seem that the offices of the Judge Advocates
59.

Art. of War

8,

62 STAT. 639, 10 U.S.C. A. § 1560 (Supp. 1950).

60. UNIroFR CODE Or MITrARY Jus'nc, Art. 37, 64 STAT. 120, 50 U.S. C. A. § 612
(Supp. 1951).
61. See the suggestions in Re, supra note 42, at 177-8; Spindler, supra note 42, at

1085-6, and Keeffe and Moskin, supra note 38, at 158-9. It is interesting to note that
Captain Ward concludes that "command control" has been "abolished" under the Code.
L. REv. 186, 224 (1953). He gives a good deal of
VSMIJ-Does It Work? 6 VANOD.
logical evidence to support this conclusion, the evidence being drawn from experience
in the District Legal Office, 12th Naval District. Captain Ward's excellent article is not
unpersuasive, but the present authors do not wholly share his optimistic viev,. Compare
Captain Ward's observations with the much more cautious ones of the Code's principal
draftsman. Morgan, The Background of the Uniform Code of Military Justlce, 6 VAD.
L. REV. 169, 183-85 (1953).
62. UNmpOmr CODE OF M=ILTARY JusTxcF, Art. 1, 64 STAT. 1oS, 50 U.S.C. A. § 551
(Supp. 1951).
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General should be merged, at least on the upper echelons, in order to
insure uniformity in procedures, as well as perhaps promote economy
of operation.' This is not said by way of criticism of the existing
offices of the Judge Advocates General. These organizations have done
a commendable job all along the line, and very few of the deficiencies
in the military justice system can be laid at their doors. But the good
job they are doing could, it would appear, be done even better through
a merger of their facilities. Of course, it may be that this problem is
merely part of the overall question of unification of the armed forces
generally, and that complete legal integration should await more complete unification on the larger scene. But it is at least time to give some
mature thought to the issue.
Criticism has also been directed at the method of appellate review
under the Code, especially in regard to the Court of Military Appeals."'
Aside from the cases in which the sentence affects a general or flag
officer or extends to death, review can be had only where a Judge Advocate General orders the case forwarded or the accused petitions the
Court of Military Appeals for review. 5 Since the majority of accused
persons are likely to be of poor background and unlearned in legal
procedure, the net result may be that in some meritorious cases petitions
for review are never filed. Extension of mandatory review seems indicated. Specific proposals for such extension will, however, have to
await further experience under the Uniform Code. 0
DEcIsIoNs BY THE COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS
How much reform the Uniform Code achieves naturally will depend
a great deal upon how it is administered, and a most important role in
that administration is played by the Court of Military Appeals. That
tribunal heard its first case in September, 1951, and a sufficient number
of decisions have been rendered to provide at least some insight into
its attitudes.
It may be categorically stated that the Court has done a thoroughly
commendable job. It seems determined to equate military and civilian
justice as far as possible. Time after time its opinions refer to this
63. See Keeffe and Moskin, supra note 38, at 151-2.
64. See Keeffe and Moskin, supra note 38, at 163-4.
65. UuNioam CODE OF MILITARY JusTIcE, Art. 67, 64 STAT. 129, S0 U.S. C. A. § 654
(Supp. 1951).
66. Other possible defects in the Code are set out in Keeffe and Moskin, supra note 38.
The present writers are not in agreement with Keeffe and Moskin on their general condemnation of the Code. Nonetheless their article makes many thoughtful observations
and is definitely "required reading" for those concerned with improvements in courtmartial procedures.
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as the objective of the Code, and cite federal and state decisions as
authorities. On numerous occasions it has reversed for prejudicial
error even in the absence of record objections by defense counselsomething which is relatively rare in civilian criminal courts. One
is impressed also with the combined scholarly and practical character
of the court's opinions. 67 The high caliber of the opinions is particularly
remarkable since the court has only three members and disposes of a
very heavy volume of litigation.
Possibly the most important holding to date is United States v. Clay,69
which decided that a failure to instruct on the presumption of innocence
and the burden of proof, as required by the Code60 and the Manual for
Courts-Martial, 0 was reversible error in a case where the accused pleaded
not guilty. 7' The Court of Military Appeals, emphasizing that the Uniform Code was designed to place military justice as far as possible on
the same plane as civilian justice, established in that case the concept of
"military due process" which includes the basic procedural rights
granted by Congress to the accused. 72 Just as a denial of constitutional
rights will constitute a deprivation of civilian due process in a civilian
court, so a denial of basic statutory rights in a military court will deprive
67. A good illustration of the practical approach is US. v. Reeves, No. 453, USCMA
(1952), where the court held that a board of review could reconsider a decision on petition
of the accused, commenting that it seems "to make good sense for a board to give
consideration to correcting any prejudicial error in a sentence while the cause is still
in its lap." A handy reference to the points of law decided by the court thus far is
the Synopsis of Military Appeals Cases in 7 U. or AftsAn L.Q. 215 (1953).
68. 1 CMR 74 (1951); noted in JAG Jou-NsAL 2 (March 1952).
69. U-nrmoaRm CODE Or Mu1=ARY Jusnci, Art. 51, 64 STAT. 124, 50 U.S.C.A. § 626
(Supp. 1951).
70. 1173 (b).
71. Cf. United States v. Lucas, 1 CMR 19 (1951) (similar error not reversible because
no material prejudice where accused had already pleaded guilty; plea took question of
innocence or guilt out of the case).
72. The court suggested these as some of the rights of military due process: "To
be informed of the charges against him; to cross-examine witnesses for the government;
to challenge members of the court for cause or peremptorily; to have a specified number
of members compose general and special courts-martial; to be represented by counsel;
not to be compelled to incriminate himself; to have involuntary confessions excluded
from consideration; to have the court instructed on the elements of the offense, the
presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof; to be found guilty of an offense
only when a designated number of members concur in a finding to that effect; to be
sentenced only when a certain number of members vote in the affirmative; and to have
an appellate review." In a provocative article Colonel Wurfel has characterized the
phrase "military due process" as an "unhelpful catchphrase . . . of nebulous meaning.'
"Military Due Process": What Is It?, 6 VAeD. L. Rxv. 251, 286 (1953) while there is
much to be said for Col Wurfel's viewpoint, the .present authors do not believe that the
phrase is so lacking in content as he contends.
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an accused of military due process. Moreover, in marking out the
bounds of military due process, cases from the civilian courts are to be
helpful guides.73
Although the Clay decision has been criticized,7 4 it represents, in our
opinion, a bold, courageous, and noteworthy achievement." In substance it transplants to military law all the rights afforded by civilian
due process which have a counterpart in the Uniform Code.70 In these
trying times, when, in some sense, at least, every civilian is a soldier,
every soldier should be a civilian so far as basic rights are concerned.
Our experience with the administrators of the legal branches of the
armed forces has convinced us that they are just as much concerned
with protecting the rights of accused persons as are civilian judges, and
we are sure that they welcome decisions such as Clay which aid in that
objective.
Another important holding which has generated some discussion is
United States v. Monge.77 In that case, the first one before the court
involving the voluntariness of confessions, a confession of theft was
obtained while accused, an 18-year old Army private of below average
intelligence, had a bayonet at his back. The self-incrimination warning
required by the Code was not given.78 Eleven hours later the soldier
was interrogated further, and this time the required warning was given.
He again admitted his guilt, and, four days later, after the same warning,
made a similar confession. Based on these later confessions, he was
convicted, and the conviction affirmed by the Court of Military Appeals. That tribunal accepted the factual finding of the court-martial
that the effect of any prior coercion had worn off.
The case has been criticized on the basis that the high court accepted
too readily the findings of the court-martial and did not make the more
independent inquiry that the Supreme Court of the United States is
inclined to pursue in such cases. 79 There is something to be said for
this criticism."0 However, even those who may disagree with this par73. "Previously adjudicated federal court cases are a source from which we can test
the prejudicial effect of denying an accused the ights we have set out as our pattern of
'military due process.'" 1 USCMA at 78.
74. Note, 20 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 490 (1952). The note maintains that the error was
not materially prejudicial.
75. See Note, 27 N. Y. U. L. REv. 163 (1952).
76. Spindler, supra note 42 at 1091.
77. 2 CMR 1 (1952).
78. UNIFORM CODE or MILITARY JUSTIcE, Art. 31, 64 STAT. 118, 50 U.S.C.A. § 602
(Supp. 1951).
79. Note, 5 VAND. L. REv. 640 (1952). Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) and
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) are illustrative of the Supreme Court's Inquiry.
80. In United States v. Webb, 2 CMR 125 (1952) the court formulated a test as
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ticular decision would seem to have no cause for serious alarm, for
Chief Judge Quinn pointed out that the principles applied in non-military courts are equally applicable to military justice, and that a confession induced by hope or fear is just as untrustworthy in a courtmartial as in a civilian court. Indeed, he went so far as to say that
the very existence of military discipline gives cause for additional suspicion towards confessions made in the presence of military superiors.
In view of these statements, it is likely that the Court of Military
Appeals in confession cases will not differ fundamentally from civilian
courts in its approach.
It is somewhat premature to speak of general trends in the decisions
of the Court of Military Appeals since experience thus far is limited.
But, tentatively at least, it may be observed that the court is more concerned (and properly so) with prejudice to the accused than with technical propositions of law. Thus it has frequently affirmed, in the face of
admitted or assumed errors,8 1 on the authority of Article 59 of the Code,
which provides in part that, "A finding or sentence of a court-martial
to review of a confession's admissibility. If the law officer could conclude within the
operation of a reasonable mind that the confession was voluntarily made, the court
must accept his conclusion; that is, the resolution of the question below must be accepted
when supported by substantial evidence even if the members of the court as individuals
might resolve the controverted facts otherwise or draw different inferences therefrom.
It may be recalled that Keeffe and Moskin referred to the limitation of review to
questions of law (CoDE or M=lITARY JusTIcE, Art. 67, 64 STAr. 129, 50 U.S.C.A. § 654
(Supp. 1951)) as a defect in the review procedure of the Court of Military Appeals, and
urged that the court have power to reweigh the evidence. Supra note 38, at 164. Their
statement that, "Not even busy civil courts are limited to a review of the law in
criminal cases", would seem to be erroneous, however. For it they cite People ex rel.
Higley v. ,Milspaw, 281 N.Y. 441, 24 N.E.2d 117 (1939), which was not a criminal
case but a habeas corpus proceeding to which the Civil Practice Act applies. The New
degree
York Court of Appeals does not review the facts in criminal cases except in first
murder convictions where the sentence is of death. Virtually none of the state highest
courts pass on fact questions in criminal cases. Therefore, the Court of Military Appeals
is in this respect merely following traditional practice.
81. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, No. 424, USCMA (1952); noted in JAG
Joup.NAL 2 (June 1952) (non-commissioned warrant officer appointed trial counsel instead
of commissioned officer); United States v. Lee, 2 CMR 118 (1952); noted in JAG
JouRNqAL (May 1952) (trial counsel conducted informal preliminary investigation and
signed charges as accuser); United States v. Bound, 2 CMR 130 (1952); noted in JAG
JouiwAL 18 (May 1952) (member was security watch when offense committed and
informally investigated it; held not prejudicial as to findings, but prejudicial as to
sentence); and United States v. Lucas, 1 CAIR 19 (1951) (president failed, in case
where accused pleaded guilty, to instruct on presumption of innocence, elements of offense,
reasonable doubt, and burden of proof); United States v. Goodrich, 1 CMR 26 (1951)
(president failed, in case where accused pleaded guilty, to take secret written ballot on
guilt). See Nesbitt, Harmless Error, JAG JoumAL 13 (March 1952).
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shall not be held incorrect on the ground of an error of law unless the
erlror materially prejudices the substantial rights of the accused. 82 On
the other hand, it has quite often reversed where prejudice was found
even in the absence of proper objection by defense counselY' In taking
cognizance of points not properly raised below, the court has been more
lenient towards accused persons than civilian appellate tribunals generally are. This does not mean, however, that defense counsel can
afford to be lax in his duties in a court-martial trial. Where minor
errors are concerned, the court has not hesitated to find a waiver from
the failure to object.8 4
Finally, it may be stated that the court has no qualms about using
plain speech to "tell off" the military authorities in the rare case where
such action. seems indicated. Thus in one case a Navy board of review
had affirmed a conviction with the notation that accused had pleaded
5 After pointing out that the record
guilty to a charge of theft.Y
was
"perfectly clear" that accused had pleaded not guilty, the court loosed
a per curiam blast at the board of review and the court-martial:
"We are unable to understand this action. . . . There is little excuse for such
obvious errors on the part of an appellate reviewing agency where the liberty
and reputation of one convicted of a serious crime is at stake.
"This record, even aside from the action of the board of review, demonstrates
a disregard for procedures required by the Uniform Code of Military Justice and
the Manual for Courts-Martial, 1951.
82. 64 STAT. 127, 50 U.S. C.A. § 646 (Supp. 1951). The Court has said: ,. . . an
appellate court is not and should not be concerned with emphasizing procedural errors
to the point where an otherwise guilty defendant is permitted to escape the penalties
properly exacted by society for his offenses." United States v. Doyle, No. 265, USCMA
(1952).
83. See e.g., United States v. Carter, 2 CMR 14 (1952); noted in JAG JouRNAL 20
(Feb. 1952) (unsworn statement of trial counsel accepted as proof of prior convictions);
United States v. Zimmerman, 2 CMR 66 (1952); noted in JAG JovuRNAL 15 (June 1952)
(similar to Carter case) ; United States v. Rhoden, 2 CMR 99 (1952) (incomplete Instruction) ; and United States v. Williams, 2 CMR 92 (1952) (erroneous instruction). See, for
discussion of the Carter and Zimmerman cases, Milota, Previous Convictions, JAG JoURNAz,15 (June 1952).
84. United States v. May, 2 CMR 80 (1952); noted in JAG JouaNAx. 2 (April 1952)
(failure of accuser to swear to charges) ; United States v. Marcy, 2 CMR 82 (1952)
(similar to May case) ; and United States v. Castillo, No. 449, USCMA (1952) ; noted In
JAG JoumNA 2 (July 1952) (improper proof of previous convictions). The Court
has said that generally errors in admitting evidence will not be considered If not objected
to, where it appears that the defense understood its right to object, unless necessary
to avoid "manifest miscarriage of justice". United States v. Masusock, 1 CMR 32 (1951).
On the importance of objections, see Van Wolkenton, Defense Techniques in the Preparation and Trial of Courts-Martial, JAG JouRxAr, 3 (May 1952).
85. United States v. James, No. 551, USCMA (1952).
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"It is not this Court alone that is endowed by Congress with responsibility for
insuring that courts-martial are conducted in accordance with required procedures.
The reforms intended by the Uniform Code of Military Justice will not be
carried out until officers concerned with ordering, conducting and reviewing courtsmartial observe scrupulously their duties and responsibilities under the Code and
the Manual. This case falls far short of meeting the required standards."

REvIEW OF COURTS-MARTIA
At first glance it might seem that federal courts have no power to
review courts-martial. Thus Article 76 of the Uniform Code makes the
findings and sentences of such tribunals "final and conclusive," and
"binding upon all departments, courts, agencies and officers of the
United States. . . 2"' This statutory provision is, however, at least
limited by the United States Constitution which ordains that, "The
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the Public Safety may require
it."8 17 In a recent case s8 the Supreme Court construed language in the
Articles of War which was very similar to the language of Article 76 as
doing no more than describing the "terminal point" for proceedings
within the court-martial system. Said the Court:
JUDICIAL

"If Congress had intended to deprive the civil courts of their habeas corpus
jurisdiction, which has been exercised from the beginning, the break with history
would have been so marked that we believe the purpose would have been made
plain and unmistakable. ' 8 9

Therefore, the federal courts today have jurisdiction, just as they
always have had,' ° to test the legality of a detention under court-martial
order.9 ' This review in habeas corpus is, however, a very limited one.
It is certainly not as broad as an appellate court's review of a trial
court, and is not even as broad as a court's review of an administrative
86. 64 STAT. 132, 50 U.S.C.A. § 663 (Supp, 1951).
87. Art. 1, § 9.
88. Gusik v. Schilder, 340 US. 128 (1950). See Pasley, Federal Courts Looh at the
Court-Martioi, 12 U. oF Prrr. L. REv. 33, 34 (1950); Wiener, The New Articles of War,
I.NANTY J. 24, 29 (Sept. 1948).

89. The legislative history of the Uniform Code dearly shows that Article 76 is not
intended to oust the federal courts of habeas corpus jurisdiction. Smr.REP. No. 486,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1949); U.S. CODE CONG. SEv. 2222, 2258 (1950).

90. See e.g., Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch 331 (U.S. 1806); Houston v. Moore, $ Wheat.

1 (U.S. 1820); Martin v. Mot, 12 Wheat. 19 (U.S. 1827); Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How.

65 (U.S. 1857).
91. Another possible, but less important, mode of collateral attack on a court-martial
proceeding is the suit for back pay. See e.g., Shapiro v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 20S
(Ct. Claims 1947); United States v. Brown, 206 U.S. 240 (1907); and Runkle v. United
States, 122 U.S. 543 (1887).
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agency's decision where the question is whether there is substantial evidence to sustain the quasi-judicial determination.9 2 In habeas corpus the
question is not guilt or innocence, preponderance of evidence, substantial
evidence, or even legal error or correctness. "'The single inquiry, the
test, is jurisdiction.' ,,03
But "jurisdiction," like so many words in the lawyer's vocabulary,
is a word of ambiguous reference. It means many things to many men.
Historically, so far as courts-martial are concerned, the jurisdictional
questions have been whether the court-martial was properly constituted,9" whether it had authority over the accused,9" whether it had the
right to try the crime charged,9" and whether it exceeded its power in
awarding sentence."T
During the past decade there have been two vaguely discernible tendencies in defining jurisdictional matters on habeas corpus review of
military tribunals. One has been the apparent tendency of the Supreme
Court to stick rather steadfastly to traditional notions of jurisdiction
in habeas corpus (something which it has not done in civilian cases),
and the other is the tendency of the lower federal courts to expand
jurisdictional concepts in an evident effort to give greater protection to
the serviceman.
Thus, examination of recent Supreme Court decisions shows that a
serviceman rarely succeeds in convincing that bench that the courtmartial which tried him lacked jurisdiction. In Humphrey v. Smith, "
for example, the Supreme Court held that failure to conduct a pre-trial
investigation in the manner prescribed by the 70th Article of War did
not deprive an Army general court-martial of jurisdiction. That Article provided that, "No charge will be referred to a general court-martial
for trial until after a thorough and impartial investigation thereof shall
have been made," but the highest bench regarded failure to comply as
not vitiating the trial proceeding. The Court regarded the fact that
Congress had not required analogous pre-trial procedures for Navy
courts-martial as an indication that an improper investigation was not
important enough to constitute a jurisdictional defect.
92. Cf. Schwartz, Habeas Corpus and Court-Martial Deviations from the Articles of
War, 14 Mo. L. Rzv. 147 (1949).
93. Justice Clark in Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, 111 (1950), quoting from In re
Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 150 (1890). See, generally, Wurfel, Military Hlabeas Corpus, 49
MIcH. L. REv. 493, 699 (1951); Snedeker, Habeas Corpus and Court Martial Prisoners,
6 VAxD. L. REV. 288 (1953).
94. United States v. Smith, 197 U.S. 386 (1905).
95. Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879).
96. Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65 (U.S. 1857).
97. Ex parte Mason, 105 U.S. 696 (1881).
98. 336 U.S. 695 (1949).
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In another case?9 it appeared that a soldier was tried by a general
court-martial of a Third Army division which was advancing rapidly
into Germany. The court-martial heard evidence and arguments of
counsel, and then continued the case in order to hear civilian witnesses
not then available. Subsequently the Commanding General of the Third
Army transferred the proceeding to the Fifteenth Army for trial on the
ground that the tactical situation and the distance from witnesses made
it impracticable for the Third Army to conduct the court-martial. It
was decided that the soldier was not put in double jeopardy by a trial
by the Fifteenth Army, since the necessity of the situation required the
discontinuance of the first trial.0 0 The Court in this case gave a very
broad interpretation to the well-recognized "necessity" principle in order
to reach its conclusion that the soldier did not suffer double jeopardy.
In Hiatt v. Brown'0 ' a general court-martial was convened containing
only one officer from the Judge Advocate General's Department. This
officer was designated as an assistant trial judge advocate, and even he
was absent from the trial on verbal orders of the convening officer. At
the time of the trial, in 1947, the 8th Article of War required the authority appointing a general court-martial to detail as law member an
officer of the Judge Advocate General's Department except when one
was "not available for the purpose." The Court held that the availability of such an officer as law member was a matter within the sound
discretion of the appointing authority, and that the record disclosed no
abuse of such discretion. By so holding, the Court conferred upon commanding officers an almost limitless discretion, and deprived the 8th
Article of any real effectiveness. In that case the Supreme Court also
commented that it was error for the Court of Appeals to extend its
review for the purpose of determining compliance with Constitutional
due process to such matters as the inadequacy of the pre-trial investigation and the incompetence of the law member and the defense counsel. To say the least, the wisdom of the Supreme Court's views in this
regard would seem to be open to much question.
The main point in another case was whether a court-martial was deprived of jurisdiction by reason of the treatment of the insanity issue.0 ' 2
99. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949).

100. Inasmuch as the Supreme Court found no double jeopardy, it did not have to
consider another problem, namely, if the court-martial improperly overruled the plea
of former jeopardy, was such an error subject to collateral attack on habeas corpus?
See, on this point, Thornton, Double Jeopardy and the Court-Martlial, 19 Bnoo.n.
L. REv. 74 (Dec. 1952).
101. See note 44 supra.
102. Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122 (1950).
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The Court held that it was not upon a showing that the investigating
officer, a neuropsychiatrist attached to the prisoner's division, the division staff Judge Advocate, the reviewing authority, and the Judge
Advocate General all gave consideration to the question, although the
defense of insanity was not raised on the trial. With the result in this
particular case there can be little quarrel, though the language of the
opinion seems unnecessarily broad.
The problem of exhaustion of administrative remedies was passed
upon in a decision which ruled that a petition for habeas corpus should
not be entertained until the prisoner applied to the Judge Advocate
*General for a new trial pursuant to Article 53 of the Articles of War. 10'
It was so held even though the petition for habeas corpus was filed
prior to the effective date of the Article and the prisoner had exhausted
the previously existing administrative remedies.
Of course, it may be mere coincidence that the Supreme Court ruled
against the complaining serviceman in all the foregoing cases. It may
be that if analogous issues had been presented in civilian cases the results would have been the same. Yet though chance may be the explanation, it is rather hard to reconcile the strict interpretation of jurisdictional matters in these military cases with the Court's construction
of "jurisdiction" when civilians bring habeas corpus.
There is a good deal of evidence, which need not be detailed here,
to support the thesis that the Supreme Court has tended during the
past decade or so to broaden the scope of review on habeas corpus in
civilian decisions involving constitutional issues.10 4 As appears from
the military cases previously discussed, it is questionable whether this
broadening also extends to prisoners in the armed services.10 5 While
After exhausting his administrative
103. Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128 (1950).
remedy Gusik did obtain a hearing on the merits in the habeas corpus proceeding. He
was, however, unsuccessful. Schilder v. Gusik, 195 F. 2d 657 (6th Cir. 1952).
104. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (court's jurisdiction, which existed
at beginning of trial, "lost" by failure to provide counsel for accused; Supreme Court
stated that the scope of inquiry in habeas corpus has been broadened) ; Waley v. Johnson,
316 U.S. 101 (1942) (coerced plea of guilty; Supreme Court declared that, "the use of
the writ [of habeas corpus] in the federal courts to test the constitutional validity of
a conviction for crime is not restricted to those cases where the judgment of conviction is void for want of jurisdiction of the trial court to render it. It extends also
to those exceptional cases where the conviction has been in disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused, and where the writ is the only effective means of preserving
his rights."); Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945) (no effective assistance of counsel);
Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941) (defendant tricked into pleading guilty).
105. Prof. Re comments that, "It cannot be said that the attitude inherent in some
lower federal court cases, which deems additional matters jurisdictional, has been approved by the United States Supreme Court. . . . However, in reversing the Court of
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there would seem to be no logical reason why a serviceman should have
less protection on habeas corpus than his civilian brother,"' it may be
that the Supreme Court decisions stand for this proposition.
Be that as it may, it is clear that the lower federal courts have
striven to broaden habeas corpus review in military cases as well as in
civilian ones. The decisions establishing this trend have been thoroughly discussed elsewhere,"0 7 and only passing reference will be made to
them.
In Schita v. King,'0 8 the Eighth Circuit held that a petition for habeas
corpus stated allegations which, if true, showed a violation of due
process in a court-martial trial, and entitled petitioner to his release.
These allegations, it will be observed, did not relate to matters traditionally deemed to affect the jurisdiction of courts-martial, but rather
were directed to a showing of a generally unfair trial. Such allegations
were in substance that petitioner had been denied military counsel of
his choice, represented by unprepared civilian counsel, deprived of the
right to call and confront witnesses, convicted on unsworn testimony,
and denied an appeal. The Circuit Court so held in "view of the trend
of modern decisions, particularly the decisions of the Supreme Court,"
this reference being to decisions in cases involving civilians. 1 3
The Ninth Circuit has perhaps intimated that its views as to fairness of military trials are similar to those of the Eighth Circuit,"' and
the Third and Fifth Circuits have taken stands along the lines of the
Schita case." The attitude of these courts might be called the "due
Appeals decision in Humrphrey v. Smith, [336 U.S. 695 (1949)] the Supreme Court indicated disapproval of the inceptive trend to broaden the traditional scope of judicial
review in the court-martial cases.' Supra note 49 at 166-7. Pasley seems to take a
simila view. Supra note 88, at 33.
106. Indeed should he not, if anything, have more protection since his original trial
has been in a somewhat more summary tribunal?
107. Pasley, supra note 88.
108. 133 F. 2d 283 (sth Cir. 1943). See the later history of the case in Schita v. Cox,
139 F. 2d 971 (Sth Cir. 1944), cert. den. sub. norn, Schita v. Pescor, 322 US. 761
(1944), rehearing den. 323 U.S. 810 (1944), and see also, Note, 21 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
492 (1953).
109. Citing inter alla Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941); Chambers v. State
of Florida, 309 US. 227 (1940); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Smith v.
O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941); and Waley v. Johnston, 316 US. 101 (1942).
110. Romero v. Squier, 133 F. 2d 528 (9th Cir. 1943), cert. den., 318 US. 785 (1943).
111. Innes v. Hiatt, 141 F. 2d 664 (3d Cir. 1944); Hiatt v. Brown, 175 F. 2d 273
(5th Cir. 1949), rev'd, 339 US. 103 (1950). In reversing, the Supreme Court did not
expressly reject or accept the due process test in court-martial cases. However, at least
one authority is of the view that the decision is a "strong implication" that the Court
has rejected such test. Pasley, supra note 88, at 32-3.
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process" approach, as compared to the "jurisdictional"-or, in layman's language, the "hands-off"-approach reflected in the decisions of
the Supreme Court heretofore discussed. Writing for the Third Circuit, Judge Mars gave a good illustration of this "due process" approach. After pointing out that the inquiry on habeas corpus is ordinarily concerned only with jurisdiction but has been extended in recent
years to embrace cases where the conviction has been in disregard of
constitutional rights, he stated:
"We think that this basic guarantee of fairness afforded by the due process
clause of the fifth amendment applies to a defendant in criminal proceedings in a
federal military court as well as in a federal civil court. An individual does not
cease to be a person within the protection of the fifth amendment to the Constitution because he has joined the nation's armed forces and has taken the oath to
support that Constitution with his life, if need be. The guarantee of the fifth
amendment that 'no person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law,' makes no exception in the case of persons who are in
the armed forces. . . . We conclude that it is open for a civil court in a habeas
corpus proceeding to consider whether the circumstances of a court-martial proceeding and the manner in which it was conducted ran afoul of the basic standard
of fairness which is involved in the constitutional concept of due process. .... ,,112

Several district courts have expressed much the same thoughts, n a as
has the Court of Claims." 4 Examination of these circuit and district
court decisions indicates a straining by such courts to expand the scope
of review and to include some of the concepts of civilian due process,
apparently because of a distrust of the military system's ability to
achieve just dispositions. The Supreme Court's attitude may demonstrate that it is not imbued with a similar distrust.
It will be interesting to observe in what direction the decisions under
the Uniform Code will lean. If the Code has the effect of increasing
the confidence of the courts in military justice-and, it may well do so,
particularly in view of the splendid Work of the Court of Military Appeals-it may be expected that the inquiry on habeas corpus will be
held to "jurisdiction" and that that term will not be defined broadly.
The present writers' preference is for expansion of habeas corpus review in military cases to the point where it coincides with the review
in civilian decisions. So far as basic standards of fairness are concerned, the serviceman should stand on the same constitutional footing
with his civilian brother.
112. 141 F. 2d 664, 666 (3d Cir. 1944).
113. Hicks v. Hiatt, 64 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1946); Beets v. Hunter, 75 F. Supp.
825 (D. Kans. 1948), rev'd on other grounds, 180 F. 2d 101 (10th Cir. 1950), cert. den.,
338 U.S. 832 (1949), 339 U.S. 963 (1950).

114. Shapiro v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 205 (Ct. Claims 1947).

1953]

MILITARY LAW-PEARL HARBOR TO KOREA

177

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF MIITARY COMISSIONS

There have been a relatively large number of decisions dealing with
military commissions in recent years. These tribunals, like courts-martial, are military courts. Unlike courts-martial, they are ordinarily appointed to perform special trial functions and do not operate within the
regular statutory framework which governs courts-martial. Their procedure is usually specially prescribed by the authority appointing them,
and the rules of evidence applied are sometimes less stringent than in
the case of courts-martial. On rare occasions such commissions have
about them the aura of a political-judicial tribunal rather than an entirely judicial one. The trend in Supreme Court decisions concerning
them has been in the direction of a "hands-off" policy similar to that
applied to courts-martial.
Ex Parte Quirin"ll was the only military commission case to come
before the Supreme Court in World War II. Seven saboteurs, wearing
German uniforms and carrying explosives and similar devices, were
landed in 1942 from German submarines on the Eastern seaboard. They
buried their uniforms and proceeded to various places in the United
States. Soon after being captured, they were placed on trial in the
District of Columbia before a military commission convened by the
President of the United States, and were charged, among other things,
with secretly passing in civilian dress through the military lines of the
United States. It was held that this charge properly alleged an offense
against the law of war which the President was authorized to have
tried by military commission even though the civilian courts were open
and functioning normally. The Court commented that it had always
"recognized and applied the law of war as including that part of the
law of nations which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status,
11 6
rights and duties of enemy nations as well as of enemy individuals."
The Quirin case seems to be quite correct in its analysis of the jurisdiction of military commissions.
After the end of World War II, the trial by military commission of
various enemy officials resulted in a number of Supreme Court cases.
The highest Court in these cases adopted an attitude which resulted
in a very narrow review of the actions of such tribunals. The decisions
in the individual cases seem to have resulted in substantial justice, but
some of the precedents established are of dub'ous character.
Shortly after the end of the war, In re Yamasita 1 7 came before the
1lS.
116.

317 U.S. 1 (1942).
Id. at 27-8.

117. 327 US. 1 (1946).

To similar effect is Homma v. Patterson, 327 U.S. 759 (1946).
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supreme bench. Yamashita, Japanese Military Governor of the Philippines and Commanding General there, was charged with violation of
the law of war in failing to control the operations of the members of his
command and permitting them to commit atrocities. He was tried before a military commission appointed by the Commanding General of
the United States Army Forces, Western Pacific. The Supreme Court
found that the commission was properly created to try violations of
the law of war, even though actual hostilities had ceased; that the
charge stated a violation of the law of war though it did not allege that
Yamashita either committed or directed the commission of the atrocities; and that the admission into evidence of depositions, hearsay, and
opinion evidence did not render the trial invalid. Trial procedure, ruled
the Court, was for the military authorities to determine. Justice Murphy registered vigorous disagreement. In his view Yamashita was
"rushed to trial under an improper charge, given insufficient time to
prepare an adequate defense, deprived of the benefits of some of the
most elementary rules of evidence and summarily sentenced to be
hanged."'118 Justice Rutledge too could not "believe in the face of this
record that [Yamashita] has had the fair trial our Constitution and
laws command.""'
Another case involved high officials of the Japanese Government and
officers of the Japanese Army who were found guilty of war crimes
against humanity by the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East. The Tribunal was set up by General MacArthur as the agent of
the Allied Powers occupying Japan. The prisoners were actually in the
custody of the Commanding General of the United States Eighth Army
who held them pursuant to the orders of General MacArthur.- The
Supreme Court decided that the military tribunal in question was "not
a tribunal of the United States," and that accordingly the courts of the
United States had "no power or authority to review, to affirm, set
aside or annul the judgments and sentences.
...
o Justice Douglas,
concurring, felt that this formula was "potentially dangerous" because
it left "practically no room for judicial scrutiny of this new type of
military tribunal which is evolving." " ' Justice Douglas assumed that
-the Court could not review the judgment of an international tribunal
as such, but he urged that its writ could run to a United States official
if such official held a prisoner in unlawful custody. The Justice posed
the problem of an American citizen tried by an international tribunal
and asked if he would have any recourse to United States courts.
118.

327 U.S. at 27-8 (1946).

119. Id. at 42.
120. Hirota v. MacArthur, et at., 338 U.S. 197, 198 (1948).
121. Id. at 203-4.
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Justice Douglas' views have much to commend them. It would
appear that the Supreme Court unnecessarily circumscribed its scope of
review in this case. As international society becomes more organized,
international courts of one sort or another are likely to become more
and more evident on the judicial scene. By limiting its review, the
highest tribunal has perhaps given an unnecessarily free rein to the
American military and civilian officials who may sit on such Courts in
the future. Wherever in the world American officials administer justice, it would seem that they should be amenable to the review of
United States civil courts.
In another case twenty-one German nationals in China were taken
into custody by the United States Army after the Japanese surrender
and were tried and convicted of violation of the laws of war by a
United States Military Commission constituted by our Commanding
General at Nanking, China. The prisoners were then repatriated to
Germany to serve their sentences under control of the United States
European Command. At no time were they within the ordinary territorial jurisdiction of any American civil court.
The Supreme Court held that the prisoners had no right to a writ
d'
of habeas corpus in a court of the United States.'- Ex parte Quirin
was distinguished on the basis that there the prisoners were in custody
in the District of Columbia and were prosecuted for acts committed
in the United States. In re Yanuishita 24 was similarly distinguished
because there the offenses were committed and the offender imprisoned
in the Philippine Islands, an insular possession over which the United
States then had sovereignty. Justice Black, joined by Justices Douglas
and Burton, dissented. The dissenters felt that the Court was adopting
a "broad and dangerous principle,"'25 and they argued for the proposition that habeas corpus jurisdiction can be exercised by our courts
"whenever any United2 0 States official illegally imprisons any person in
any land we govern."
Again the dissenting opinion would seem to set forth the preferable
rule. Why should American military---or for that matter, civilianofficials be given carte blanche in conducting trials, merely because the
accused persons have not set foot on American territory?
In an important Supreme Court decision on military commissions,'
122.

Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 US. 763 (1950).

123.

317 U.S. 1 (1942).

124.
125.

327 U.S. 1 (1946).
See note 122 supra, at 795.

126.
127.

Id. at 798.
Aladsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952).

See the related problem discusfed in

Brock, Military Jurisdiction Over the 'Civilian Component" of the Armed Forces,

J. 9 (Dec. 1952).
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it appeared that Yvette Madsen, a native-born American, resided in
Germany with her husband, an Air Force Lieutenant. In 1950 the
United States Court of the Allied High Commission for Germany convicted her of murdering her husband. After affirmance of the conviction by the Court of Appeals of the United States Courts of the Allied
High Commission, Mrs. Madsen sought release in a habeas corpus
proceeding brought in the United States District Court. The Supreme
Court held that the occupation court, as a military commission or
"common-law war court," had authority, derived from the President,
to try her. The highest Court rejected her argument that certain amendments to the Articles of War extending the jurisdiction of courts-martial
had deprived military commissions and similar tribunals of their powers.
Justice Black dissented, expressing the view that "if American citizens
in present-day Germany are to be tried by the American Government,
they should be tried under laws passed by Congress and in courts
created by Congress under its constitutional authority."128
The Madsen case is encouraging in that it shows the Supreme Court
will scrutinize at least to some extent the actions of American military
commissions and similar bodies where American citizens are concerned.
It is to be regretted, however, that the Court has been so much less
diligent in protecting non-citizens who are under American control.
While Justice Black's dissent in Madsen is not unimpressive, it is
doubtful whether there is much authority to sustain his view. However
desirable it may be, as a matter of policy, that American citizens in
an occupied but thoroughly peaceful country be tried in courts created
by Congress, it is hard to make a legal argument that such a procedure
inust be followed. That question is one which the policy-making officials
of the executive and legislative branches of the Government must resolve, and is not for judges to determine.
The questions raised by the more widespread use abroad of military
commissions and similar bodies have by no means all been answered.
Indeed no great predictive vision is required to see that the myriad
questions presented will increase rather than diminish in the next few
years.
MARTIAm LAW

The legal effect of a declaration of martial law is a problem which
rarely comes before the courts. Seldom in this peaceful country do
national or community situations become so critical as to call for martial
law. But World War II brought forth a grave emergency and a declaration of martial law in the Territory of Hawaii.
128.

Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 372 (1952).
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Immediately after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor the Governor
of Hawaii suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
placed martial law in effect, pursuant to Section 67 of the Hawaiian
Organic Act. 12 9 The Army Commanding General in Hawaii thereupon
proclaimed himself Military Governor and established military "Provost
Courts" to take the place of ,the civilian courts. The Supreme Court
of the United States held, however, that Section 67 did not give the
armed forces power to substitute military for judicial trials of civilians
not charged with violations of the law of war at a time when the civilian
courts were capable of functioning. 30 In a concurring opinion, Justice
Murphy declared that "the usurpation of civil power by the military
is so great in this instance as to warrant this Court's complete and
outright repudiation of the action."1 3 '
While necessarily somewhat sid generis and therefore difficult to fit
into the stream of authority, the case is heartening in its final vindication of the principle of supremacy of civil power. This is not to say
that the military officials in Hawaii are themselves to be condemned.
Undoubtedly they acted in entire good faith and in accordance with
what they regarded as the necessities of the situation. But illegal action,
albeit in good faith, is no substitute for due process of law.12 SUMMARY AND CoNcLusIONs

A decade ago the American system of military law was somewhat out
of date and too much rooted in the past. During and after World War
II it was criticized, among other things, for sometimes permitting the
imposition of unduly harsh sentences, occasionally being subject to
control of commanding officers, and often failing to use adequate numbers of legally trained personnel.
While much of this criticism may have been unwarranted, in the
last analysis it had a good effect because born of it was the Uniform
Code of Military Justice. The Code achieves substantial improvement
in the military legal system. It provides an independent court of civilians
as the top tribunal of the court-martial system, and insures that a law
officer and adequately trained prosecution and defense counsel will ap129. 31 STAT. 141, 153.
130. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
131. Id. at 325.
132. See, generally, Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule and the National Emergency,
Law in Hawaii: A Defense of the
55 HAuv. L. REv. 1253 (1942); Houston, Mart

War-Time Military Governor, 36 A.B.A.J. 825 (1950); AlcCollock, Now It Can Be
Told: Judge Metzger and the Maitary, 35 A.B.A.J. 365 (1949); Fixel, Suspensior of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus in Hawaii Following Pearl Harbor, JAG JoUnu-Ar BULL.
No. 8, 42 (July 1951).
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pear in all trials by general court-martial. Unfortunately the potential
dangers of "command control" have not been eliminated. The commanding officer still appoints the members of the court, the law officer
and the trial and defense counsel, and reviews the findings and sentence.
Moreover, the method the Code provides for bringing appeals before
the Court of Military Appeals may not be of the best. Yet, while the
"reform" has not been as great as perhaps it could have been, military
law is certainly moving in the right direction. The early decisions of
the Court of Military Appeals reinforce this conclusion because they
show that the Court is much concerned with the rights of servicemen
and is striving to equate as far as possible "military due process" with
civilian due process. The same may be said of the Judge Advocates
General of the services, and their subordinates.
The law of judicial review of courts-martial has been going through
a period of flux, with apparently opposing tendencies manifesting themselves in the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts. While the
general picture is tinged with shadows which make analysis difficult,
it seems that the-Supreme Court is taking a narrow view of its habeas
corpus jurisdiction where servicemen are concerned. This is in contrast with the broad view it takes in civilian cases. The lower federal
courts, on the other hand, are applying the broad "due process" approach
of the Supreme Court civilian decisions to military cases. The attitude
of the lower federal courts seems preferable. Especially in an era such
as this when large standing armies will be with us for many years to
come, the constitutional protections of the serviceman should not be
watered down by a niggardly application of habeas corpus jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court has also tended to limit sharply the review of
judgments of military commissions, and has refused entirely to review
the actions of such bodies where the tribunal is international in character
or where the accused persons are aliens who have never come within
American territory. This seems unfortunate. American political-military
control seems destined to continue for a number of years in many
areas of the globe, and at least the basic notions of American justice
should follow the flag. When Americans, whether military men or
civilians, administer justice abroad, civil courts of the United States
should assert the power to see to it that this justice is in accordance
with our country's ideals and traditions. Our system of law is one great
mark of our democracy, and it should not be labeled "For domestic
use only."
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